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On the scale between central and decentralised systems, the emphasis for the institu-
tional design of Tanzania leans more towards decentralisation. This is laid down in acts 
and policy papers. The reason for decentralisation was prompted partly by the idea that 
sustainable local development depends on community participation. In an effort to 
realise participation in the bottom-up planning process the government introduced the 
Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) methodology. The O&OD 
methodology is a participatory community planning process to empower the people on 
the basis of bottom-up approach and positive thinking.  
The success of this bottom-up planning process depends on the extent to which the 
local government reform has created the institutional arrangements that facilitate the 
process. This study attempts to answer the following research question: 
 
To what extent do the government institutional arrangements in Tanzania facilitate or 
impede participation for local development and what improvements can be made?  
 
This research question breaks down into five specific questions. First of all: to what 
extent is there development in the infrastructure of primary facilities? The main ob-
jective of this question is to establish the extent to which there is really development at 
the local level. The aim of the answers to the following three questions is to examine the 
influence of the bottom-up planning process for this local development. These questions 
are: to what extent do the local people participate in the bottom-up planning process? To 
what extent does the bottom-up planning process contribute to local development? And 
finally: what factors facilitate or impede participation for local development? As the 
central research question also aims at formulating recommendations for improvement, 
the last sub question is: what improvements can be made to improve participation for 
local development?  
Theoretical framework of the study 
The reform of the local government structure in Tanzania is guided by the principle of 
Decentralisation by Devolution. The main idea of decentralising is to transfer govern-
ment responsibilities to lower units of government. The essence of this is that the lower 
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units of government, which are closer to the people, will have access to local inform-
ation and therefore, are in a good position to make decisions that are relevant to local 
needs and involve the local people in the process. However, in any system of govern-
ment there is always a certain degree of decentralisation. The properties that determine 
the amount of decentralisation are related to legal limitations and obligations, fiscal 
strings, oversight arrangements and possible influence with regard to the appointment of 
personnel.  
Although the policy paper and the central ideology intend more decentralisation, the 
institutional framework in Tanzania has many centralist characteristics. First of all, the 
local government authorities are legally bound by the regulations of the central 
government. The local government authorities have only limited discretion over re-
sources to implement their own wishes. The bulk of funds the local government authori-
ties can spend is allocated by the central government. The local government authorities 
have very limited ability for collecting local taxes that would finance their autonomy. 
And finally with regard to the personnel: it is striking that many of the staff members of 
the local government authorities are actually appointed by the central government.  
The current institutional framework in Tanzania is the legacy of many attempts to 
change the relationship between central and decentral governmental bodies. The main 
goal was to enhance participation of local communities. This resulted in quite different 
policy choices. In 1962 the local government authorities (LGAs) were introduced, while 
in 1972 these decentral authorities were abolished and replaced by deconcentrated in-
stitutions. In 1982 the LGAs were re-introduced. The institutional changes were further 
strengthened by the policy papers on local government reform in 1998. The reform is 
guided by the principle of Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D). One outcome of the 
reform, as a strategy to enhance participation, is bottom-up planning. The bottom-up 
planning process aims at involving the local communities in the decision-making pro-
cess. The main idea is that the central government has to support local initiatives, as this 
would result in a decision that is supported by the local communities themselves. The 
expectation is that the local communities will thus be more willing to contribute to and 
to maintain the infrastructural investments.  
To assess whether or not this bottom-up planning process is really contributing to 
development, two policy areas have been selected. These policy areas are primary 
health services and primary education. Both are social services that cannot be realised 
by local communities without external support. Chapter 5 provides a brief history of the 
provision of health and education services and the delivery system during the reform. It 
also demonstrates the importance of infrastructure in the delivery of both primary health 
and primary education. 
Chapter 6 describes the theoretical framework of the study. The focus of the research 
is on the bottom-up planning process as a strategy to enhance participation for local 
development. The theoretical framework looks at the bottom-up planning process from 
two main aspects. The first aspect is based on the theory of Decentralisation by Devo-
lution (D by D). In this theory, the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are con-
sidered to be autonomous institutions that are responsive to local wishes. With the 
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autonomy, it is envisaged that LGAs have discretion over resources in order to respond 
to needs as expressed by the population.  
The second aspect took into consideration the effects of the links with the possible 
actors. These links might threaten the functioning of the bottom-up planning process. 
The first link was the central-local relationship. The LGAs depend on the central 
government for technical and financial support. It is, therefore, expected that this 
relationship will influence the bottom-up planning process. The second link is the rela-
tionship between the district council and the lower local government structures. It is 
expected that this relationship will influence the planning process as the district council 
has its own sources of information to collect directly from the facilities involved. A 
third threat to the success of the bottom-up planning process is the relationship between 
community members and development partners. This relationship is considered impor-
tant as it could ensure easier implementation of the local wishes. As such, local develop-
ment can be taken for granted as a result of the bottom-up planning process. In general, 
the three links provide alternative explanations for development of the facilities in-
volved, without using the bottom-up planning process.  
Empirical study  
The expectations have been tested in a case study. The cases are selected on two levels: 
first a selection of the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) and second a selection of 
the primary facilities within the respective LGAs. The selection of the LGAs was based 
on their involvement in the first phase of the roll-out process of Opportunities and Ob-
stacles to Development (O&OD) methodology. This led to the selection of three LGAs 
from one region to facilitate data collection: Morogoro District-Urban, Morogoro Dis-
trict-Rural and Kilosa District.  
In every LGA the two primary facilities were selected: one primary school and one 
primary health facility. The selected facilities were those that were considered ‘success-
ful’ by the district council officials in the sense that there was development between 
2005 and 2008. This selection criterion makes it easier to assess whether or not the 
bottom-up planning process did contribute to this development. This led to the selection 
of six cases: Kingorwila Dispensary and Mlimani Primary School in Morogoro District-
Urban; Tawa Health Centre and Ngerengere Primary School in Morogoro District-
Rural; and Kidodi Health Centre and Malowelo Primary School in Kilosa District. In 
the empirical research the planning process was reconstructed with regard to these 
facilities, using various methods: documentary review, information from archives, direct 
observation, individual interviews and group interviews. These cases are then described 
in a similar way describing every step in the bottom-up planning procedure.  
Comparison and analysis  
Chapter eleven presents the analysis and comparisons of the study. This chapter at-
tempted to answer the research question. The first attempt to answer this question is by 
establishing the extent to which there is development at the local level. Some cases (i.e 
selected primary facilities) are better developed compared to others in the district. The 
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level of development can be examined using the two indicators: the increase of the three 
infrastructural aspects (i.e building, equipment and staff) in the period between 2005 
and 2008, and the extent to which they meet the national minimum standards.  
The analysis of the six cases shows that development of the local facilities is rather 
low. Some aspects of infrastructure have not increased and most of them do not meet 
the national minimum standards. Despite low development of primary facilities, there 
are variations between the cases. The cases can be divided into three categories: more 
developed, moderate developed and less developed. On the basis of the score on this 
level it is possible to evaluate the influence of the bottom-up planning process or other 
factors that contribute to development.  
Participation in the bottom-up planning process and its possible contribution to local 
development  
As stipulated in local government reform, the primary means of achieving local devel-
opment is through the bottom-up planning process. The bottom-up planning process is 
supposed to enhance participation for local development. The second step in the 
analysis is to examine the participation of the people in the bottom-up planning process 
and to assess the extent to which this contributed to local development. 
The study shows that participation of the local people in the bottom-up planning 
process is poor. People are not aware of preferences contained in their village or ward 
plan and they also do not make use of the plan. This indicates that local people do not 
see the relevance of the bottom-up planning process on their local needs. 
Participation from the local people in bottom-up planning process transcends the 
understanding and the use of the respective plan. It also involves the question of 
whether or not the district council takes the preferences expressed in the village plan 
into account when deciding upon the allocation of funds. After all, participation in the 
bottom-up planning process would be useless if the voices of the people are not taken 
into account. The comparison of the six cases indicates that local preferences contained 
in the village plan are poorly taken into account by the district council. The links 
between local preferences in the village plan and the development interventions of the 
district plan are not clear. This indicates that the basis for preparations of the district 
plan is not the local plan developed through bottom-up planning process. Apparently the 
district uses other sources of information and other criteria to decide upon the develop-
ment of the facilities.  
Overall, participation of the local people in bottom-up planning process including 
poor consideration of local preferences at district level is not able to explain local 
development. The analysis of the six cases shows no links between the understanding 
and concerns of the local people and the local plans, there are also no links between the 
local plans and the district plan. However, we still see development at the local level, 
which even occurred at various levels. Therefore it is still relevant to examine the 
possible contributing factors to this local development.  
How did local development happen?  
The study shows that local initiatives and external financial support contribute to local 
development. The two factors seem to stimulate each other. The descriptions of the six 
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cases show that sometimes, local initiative attracts development partners to directly 
support local development. On the other hand, external financial support motivates the 
local people to take the initiative and to participate in local development as well as 
monitoring the process. The positive impact of the relationship between local initiatives 
and external financial support for local development is due to the fact that external 
support is often directed to actual preferences of the local people.  
The cases illustrate that both local initiatives and external financial support are good 
explanations for the development that occurred in the selected cases. It appears that in 
some communities the members are more active and more resourceful than in others. 
The success of development is affected by the involvement of educated people that have 
influence on the administration of primary facilities and know how to obtain funds to 
realise their wishes. Likewise, some facilities are located in areas with more opportuni-
ties for external financial support, for instance in an urban and economically active area. 
These areas attract both capable people to take initiative and make it easier to convince 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) to contribute.  
Possible explanations for the failure of the bottom-up planning process 
The interim conclusion is that there is willingness to participate in improving the local 
facilities, but that the bottom-up planning process, as it is carried out, is not capable of 
attracting this motivation from the local communities. The failure of the bottom-up 
planning process to facilitate participation for local development is contributed by the 
way the process is carried out. In theory, district plans are supposed to be developed on 
the basis of the preferences of the local people expressed through the bottom-up plan-
ning process. The intention is that by involving the local people in the bottom-up 
planning process and the development of programmes that are relevant to local needs, 
will create a sense of ownership.  
However, the planning process does not sufficiently encourage the local people to 
participate in local development. Community members have no confidence that the 
planning process will address their needs. Even when they participate, they do not take 
it seriously. The facilitators of the bottom-up planning process are the council officials 
working in the lower local government structure and they are trained by officials at 
council level on how to carry out the process and achieve the expected results. In this 
regard, the guidance of the facilitators to the planning process is directed towards 
collecting local information that fulfils the wishes of official at the district council. After 
all, the local plans are vague and sometimes do not reflect local needs.  
In practice the contents of the district plan is mainly based on district officials’ 
knowledge of the local situations, collected through other means. The district officials 
use other sources of information, parallel to bottom-up planning process to collect this 
information. These mechanisms include the facility plans and the frequently used 
reporting systems. These mechanisms are not participatory and therefore contradict the 
philosophy of bottom-up planning process. 
Compared to the bottom-up planning process, which provides opportunity for all the 
community to participate, both facility plans and reports are developed by people in-
volved in the administration. Note that the staff in the lower local government structures 
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is actually employees of the district council. In that regard the district officials will pay 
more attention to these other sources of information compared to the information col-
lected through the bottom-up planning process.  
The fact that district staff ignores wishes expressed through the bottom-up planning 
process is due to the central government’s oversight and control. The LGAs depend on 
government transfers for more than 90% of their budget. Most of these transfers are 
accompanied with detailed guidelines and directives. The response to the central wishes 
expressed through guidelines and directives is checked through the planning process. 
After all, the planning process involves scrutiny at the district level and the regional 
level before it is forwarded to the central government for further scrutiny and approval. 
So the entire procedure is aimed at complying with these guidelines and directives 
instead of trying to respond to local wishes.  
The detailed guidelines, directives and instructions leave limited room for local 
government discretion. As a result, LGAs are merely implementers of the national 
programmes and directives. This contradicts the overall philosophy of Decentralisation 
by Devolution (D by D) and in particular the ideas of the bottom-up planning process. 
The local preferences seem only to be considered if they comply with central wishes.  
To avoid the risk of remaking the plans, the district staff is very keen to respond to 
central wishes. As a result, they more or less ignore the preferences expressed by local 
communities. This attitude is worsened by the fact that there is almost no downward 
accountability. There are no mechanisms that enable the local people to hold the local 
government staff accountable. On the contrary, the employees that facilitate the bottom-
up planning process are employees of the district council and the civil servants that 
work at the district level are employed by the central government. These ties between 
the staff of both district and central government impede the willingness to respond to 
local needs. After all, decisions for their transfer and increase in salaries are made by 
the central government. There are also indications that local government staff were still 
assigned duties directly from their respective sectoral ministries. In other words, the 
sectoral ministries appear to have not yet devolved their roles and staff to the district 
governments. Consequently there are more incentives for the local government staff to 
respond to the central wishes than to the local wishes.  
Conclusion and recommendations  
The main conclusions of the study and recommendations are presented in chapter 
twelve. This research affirms that the government institutional arrangements do not 
support the bottom-up planning process to enhance participation for local development. 
The reasons are first of all, poor adherence to the local government reform policy. This 
is why the following recommendations are brought forward for consideration:  
• Give the local people the opportunity to make their own choices without influence 
from either the central government or the district council.  
• Let the local people develop strategies to implement their local needs. In other 
words, avoid strategies imposed from above, which might not be honoured by the 
local people.  
• Strengthen the downward accountability mechanisms. 
  
165
• Honour as much as possible the local wishes by basing the decision-making at the 
district on the local plans.  
• Harmonise the reporting system.  
• Reduce the strings attached to the budgetary allocation system to give the LGAs 
financial autonomy.  
• Let the LGAs have adequate control over own staff. In other words, give the LGAs 
the power to recruit their own staff and plan for the development of their career.  
 
There is even doubt as to whether or not there will be meaningful participation if these 
recommendations are carried out. The main problem is that the district council is still far 
from the local communities. Therefore, the research concludes with two more recom-
mendations:  
• Extend devolution to the lowest structures of government. 
• Harmonise the local government structure and the central government structure into 
one government structure.  
 

